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Although the Supreme Court will have to retreat somewhat from
the absolute wording of Mullane to uphold the constitutionality of a
rule that does not require individual notice in all cases to known per-
sons, rule 23 should, nevertheless, be amended, 51 and the Court
should uphold it.52  Cases such as Eisen, although decided correctly
under the present rule, demonstrate -the need for a device that will help
to create "a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well
as -to those liberally endowed with power and wealth.
15 3
PRCHiARD G. CHANEY
Constitutional Law-Executive Privilege: Tilting the Scales in
Favor of Secrecy
Executive privilege is a concept invoked by members of the
executive branch of the government -to justify withholding evidence and
other communicative materials from the legislative and judicial
branches.' Since 17922 debate surrounding the doctrine has been pre-
51. The amended rule should make no distinction between subdivision (b) (3) and
subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (2) with regard to the notice requirement. It would still
be appropriate, however, to require the court to find that the class action is the best
available means for handling the controversy. See note 52 infra. The court will also
have discretion under subsection (d) to direct that notice be provided to the class mem-
bers when the court feels it is necessary.
52. Not everyone agrees that the class action is the best method for dealing with
antitrust and securities actions involving a very large number of potential claimants.
See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated,
94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974); Kaplan, supra note 42, at 394; H. FRiENDLY, FEDERAL JURIS-
DicTIoN: A GENERAL Vmw 118-20 (1973). Although arguments against such use of
the class action may have merit, they should not be determinative of the notice required
by due process once the court has determined that no better method exists for handling
the controversy, as it must under subdivision (b) (3). One factor in the determination
may be the possible necessity for future notice to the class members for the purpose of
filing proofs of loss after the defendant is found liable. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 391 F.2d 555, 567 (2d Cir. 1968). This possibility alone, however, should not
preclude use of the class action. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726
(1967). In fact, in such a situation it-may be possible to require the defendant to fi-
nance the notice. Comment, 29 MD. L. Rv., supra note 30, at 157.
53. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2157 (1974) (Douglas, I., dis-
senting).
1. Cf. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.DC.
1966), aff'd per curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
2. In refusing to turn over documents requested by Congress in its inquiry into
a disastrous military expedition against a tribe of Indians, President Washington con-
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dominated by three questions. First, is executive privilege consti-
tutionally based? Secondly, who is the final judge of the validity of
any assertion of the privilege? Thirdly, assuming that the judiciary has
the power to review such assertions, what is the scope of the privilege,
and what guidelines will be used to determine whether, in a given case,
the assertion of the privilege is warranted? 3 In United States v. Nixon4
a unanimous5 Supreme Court gave its first definitive answers to these
questions. The Court held that, while the privilege is rooted in the
Constitution, the courts, and not the Executive, must be the final
arbiters of the scope and the validity of any claim of executive privilege.
The case arose out of an unusual chain of events. On March 1,
1974, a federal grand jury investigating the case of United States v.
Mitchell" indicted seven individuals7 for conspiracy to obstruct justice
and to defraud the United States. Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor s
was granted a -third-party subpoena duces tecum, pursuant to Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 17(c), requiring the pre-trial production
of certain tape recordings and documents that were in the President's
possession. In response, counsel for the President filed a motion to
quash the subpoena, accompanied by a formal claim of privilege. The
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion to quash
tended that "the executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would
permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the public."
STAFF OF SUBCOMm. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JuDI-
cIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., MEMOS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE PowFR OF
THE PRESIDENT TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM THE CONGRESS 5 (1958). The presi-
dential use of executive privilege has become more and more widespread in the twentieth
century. President Eisenhower's letter to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, directing
both the Secretary and his subordinates to refrain from testifying about executive discus-
sions on the Army-McCarthy dispute, provided substantial precedential authority for the
withholding of information in quasi-judicial proceedings. This trend toward secrecy was
accelerated by the Nixon administration. See R. BERGER, ExECUTIVE PRIVILEoE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL MYn- 252-64 (1974); F. RouRKE, SECRECY AND PUBLICITY 65-74
(1961); W. TAFT, TAE PRESmENT AND His POWERS 129 (1916).
3. A fourth question, whether decisions adverse to the President can be enforced,
and how, has also been posed during the debate. The question will not be definitively
answered until circumstances precipitate a constitutional crisis of greater magnitude than
any yet seen.
4. 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974).
5. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
6. Criminal No. 74-110 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 1, 1974).
7. The defendants were John N. Mitchell, H.R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman,
Charles W. Colson, Robert C. Mardian, Kenneth W. Parkinson, and Gordon Strachan.
All of the defendants were either members of the White House staff or occupied a posi-
tion of responsibility in the 1972 Committee for the Re-Election of the President. 94
S. Ct. at 3097 n.3.
8. The Attorney General delegated the authority to represent the United States
in matters arising out of the investigation of the "Watergate affair" to a Special Prosecu-
tor. 38 Fed. Reg. 30739, as amended, 38 Fed. Reg. 32805 (1973).
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and ordered the prompt production of the subpoenaed items. The
President gave notice of appeal, and subsequently, the Special Prosecu-
tor filed in the Supreme Court a petition for writ of certiorari before
judgmentY Because of the unique setting in which the dispute arose,
the Court granted the petition,'0 bringing before it the important ques-
tions presented by the President's assertion of executive privilege.
After dispensing with several important preliminary questions,"-
Chief Justice Burger examined the two arguments made by the Presi-
dent's counsel in support of a constitutionally based executive privilege.
First, -the President contended that the constitutional doctrine of the
separation of powers guaranteed the absolute independence of -the
Executive in the fulfillment of his Article II duties and that this "in-
dependence . . . insulates a president from judicial subpoena."'"
Secondly, the President argued that the powers expressly delegated to
the Executive by the Constitution carry with them certain inherent
powers and privileges that are necessary to their efficient performance.
Acknowledging the validity of these arguments, Chief Justice Burger
recognized a privilege in favor of the Executive resting on "constitu-
tional underpinnings."'" The Court reasoned that occasions may arise
in which the Executive could obtain candid advice from his advisers
only by insuring them that their comments would not be made public.-4
The privilege granted to the President was necessary, therefore, to in-
sure efficiency in the executive decisionmaking process.
The Court next considered the President's contention that the
privilege was unreviewable. 15 The Chief Justice first examined the
judiciary's role in the tripartite federal government. Admitting -that
each branch must individually interpret ,the Constitution in the pursu-
ance of its constitutional duties, he nonetheless reiterated that "it is
'emphatically the province and the duty' of this Court 'to say what the
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(e) (1970); 94 S. Ct. at 3098-100 & n.1. Because
the district court's order was "final" and therefore appealable and because of the special
circumstances in the case, the Court felt that the petition for writ of certiorari before
judgment was appropriate in Nixon. Id. at 3099.
10. 94 S. Ct. at 3098.
11. The Court considered claims that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, that the
dispute was not justiciable and that the Special Prosecutor had failed to comply with
the requirements of FED. R. CGlm. P. 17(c). 94 S. Ct. at 3098-105. The Court's treat-
ment of these issues is noteworthy itself. See note 44 infra.
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law is' . . . "16 Therefore, all such constitutional interpretations, re-
gardless of the branch making them, are subject to Supreme Court
review.1 7  This power to determine whether an action by another
branch exceeds its constitutional mandate is based upon the separation
of powers doctrine, which delegates to the Court its role as the ultimate
interpreter of -the Constitution.18 The Chief Justice reasoned that since
such judicial review encompasses the powers expressly delegated by
the Constitution, it must likewise extend "to powers alleged to derive
from enumerated powers."'" Thus, the Court has the authority to re-
view claims of privilege whether based upon the express or the implied
powers of the President.
After concluding that the judiciary is the final arbiter of the
validity of any claim of executive privilege, the Court formulated a test
for determining the merits of such claims. Chief Justice Burger first
discussed the judiciary's constitutional mandate to conduct trials in
accordance with due process, which, he suggested, is in direct conflict
with the exercise of the President's privilege. As seen by the Chief
Justice, the primary responsibility of the courts is to facilitate the
"search for truth." This duty is fulfilled through "full disclosure of all
the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence."20  Privileges
to withhold evidence are "not lightly created nor expansively construed,
for they are in derogation of the search for truth."' Because of this
concern, only the most exigent circumstances justify the compromise
of these judicial principles. Therefore, since "the legitimate needs of
the judicial process"" may outweigh the President's privilege in some
situations, the Court adopted a balancing test to weigh these competing
interests.
In order, however, to protect the need for security in the executive
decisionmaking process, 23 the Court felt compelled 'to show deference
to the President in formulating the balancing test. Chief Justice Burger
therefore termed the privilege "presumptive": 24  when the President
asserts the privilege, the party seeking production has the burden of
going forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
16. Id., quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
17. 94 S. Ct. at 3106-07.
18. Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. 94 S. Ct. at 3105 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 3108.
21. Id.; see id. at 3108 n.18.
22. Id. at 3107.
23. Sqee text accompanying note 14 supra.
24. 94 S. Ct. at 3107-08.
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Applying this test to the facts in Nixon, the Chief Justice ruled
that the claim of privilege could not prevail. The specific need for
obtaining relevant evidence in a pending criminal proceeding and the
sixth amendment guarantees of fair trial and compulsory process out-
weighed the President's claim of privilege. The Court noted, however,
that the claim of privilege in this case was general-based solely on
the need to insure effective decisionmaking. The Court further noted
that the President's claim made no reference to military or diplomatic
matters. Indeed, the Court intimated that, had these elements been
present, the result may have been different.25  Likewise, the Chief
Justice expressly refused to consider whether a civil litigant's rights
could outweigh even a generalized claim of privilege like that asserted
in Nixon.26
The Court's ruling is the foreseeable result of over 150 years of
litigation involving executive privilege. Arguments presented in favor
of the privilege have been rooted in the common law,27 in the concept
of the separation of powers28 and in -the nature of the executive branch
itself. Regardless of its basis, the privilege has continually been
recognized as a valid exception to the general rules of evidence.
29
In 1807 in United States v. Burr ° Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, sit-
ting as a trial judge, ruled that President Jefferson must deliver con-
fidential correspondences to the court for use by the defendant in a
25. Id. at 3108-09.
26. Id. at 3108-09 n.19.
27. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807);
F. RoURKE, supra note 2, at 63; Berger, The President, Congress and the Courts, 83
YALE L.J 1111 (1974); Annot., 95 L. Ed. 425 (1950); cf. United States ex rel. Touhy
v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951). The common law basis of executive privilege is doubt-
ful. In the year that the Constitution was adopted by the United States, a British court
stated that "it is to be observed, that the crown can no more withhold evidence of docu-
ments in its possession, than a private person. If the court thinks proper to order the
production of any public instrument, that order must be obeyed." The Ship Columbus,
1 Collectanea Juridica 88, 92 (Adm. 1789). Not until fifty-three years later did the
British courts recognize a privilege for "candid exchange" at high levels. Smith v. East
India Co., 41 Eng. Rep. 550 (Ch. 1841). After sweeping extension in Duncan v. Cam-
mell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (making the privilege conclusive), the House of
Lords repudiated the privilege in Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910.
28. See United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974). But see Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam), in which the court reasoned that
the recognition of the type of privilege urged in Nixon would amount to a breach of
the separation of powers.
29. E.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (1971) (per curiam); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No.
14,692d) (C.C. D. Va. 1807).
30. 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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pending criminal trial. In the course of his opinion, the Chief Justice
acknowledged, in dictum, an exception in favor of the Executive to the
general rule that "the public . . . has a right to every man's evi-
dence."-" The court did not, however, specifically acknowledge the
basis of the privilege, define its scope, or establish a method for
determining its validity in a given case. It held merely -that there were
situations in which certain documents in the President's possession
should not be opened to the public view. Because Chief Justice
Marshall stated that the privilege resulted from the President's position
of public responsibility, 2 he arguably based the privilege on the
inherent powers of the President.
Subsequent decisions indicated a trend toward executive absolut-
ism, at least in the area of military secrets.33 Such decisions intimated
that the judiciary would be precluded from even considering claims of
executive privilege. These decisions did not determine the scope and
the validity of assertions of executive privilege, holding only that
military and diplomatic secrecy required judicial protection. A line of
cases in the lower federal courts, however, uniformly held that the
power to determine the scope of executive privilege and to determine
the validity of refusals to disclose communications rested solely in the
judiciary as a result of the separation of powers doctrine.3 4
In United States v. Reynolds"5 the Supreme Court agreed with
these lower courts. Passing on a claim of privilege asserted by the gov-
ernment in a suit under the Tort Claims Act, the Court stated that
"[t]he court itself must determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate for the claim of privilege. . . . Judicial control over the
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive offi-
31. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950); cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
32. 25 F. Cas. at 192.
33. E.g., United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951); Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); Dayton
v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912). But see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1
(1953); Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958); Cresmer v. United
States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (which all strongly suggest that even this privi-
lege is not absolute).
34. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U.S.
1 (1953); United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 4 F.R.D. 108 (W.D.N.Y. 1964);
O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Zimmerman v. Poindexter,
74 F. Supp. 933 (D. Hawaii 1947); Bank Line v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1946); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y.
1943).
35. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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cers."3' 0 This ruling has been followed by courts subsequently faced
with claims of privilege .
7
Although these cases seemingly established the supremacy of the
judiciary in deciding such disputes, they did not elucidate a method for
determining the validity of specific claims of executive privilege. A
test later evolved in the lower courts, however, under which the moving
party's need for the documents was balanced against the reasons
asserted by the government in defending their confidentiality.38 This
adjustment of competing interests has been used most notably in cases
involving generalized claims of privilege based solely upon the sanctity
of the executive decisionmaking process." In Nixon v. Sirica 'the
standard was further refined by the recognition of a "presumptive
privilege" in favor of the President, showing deference to the Executive
in striking the balance.
41
The balancing test that developed in the lower federal courts was
adopted in its entirety by the Supreme Court in Nixon. This test is
deceptively simple. When the President determines that evidentiary
materials sought by legal process should not be disclosed, he will assert
the privilege. This assertion is presumed to be valid and thus shifts
the burden of going forward to the party seeking produotion. The
moving party must then rebut the presumption. Once this has
occurred, the relative merits of both parties are weighed and the court
decides whether production is warranted.
The strengths of this test are readily apparent. Primarily, the
36. Id. at 8-10.
37. Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers Local 537, 334 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1964);
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshal, 280 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Overby v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 224 F.2d 158, 163 (5th Cir. 1955); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See also Rosee v. Board of
Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 689 (N.D. IM. 1965).
38. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam);
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.LD. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), afI'd per
curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
39. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiarn); Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
952 (1967).
40. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In this case the court was pre-
sented with arguments similar to those in United States v. Nixon. Here, the President
sought to withhold tape recordings from the grand jury, rather than from the prosecution
or defense.
41. Id. at 717.
1974] 425
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flexibility inherent in balancing tests is well suited for insuring the max-
imum sanctity of conflicting interests-here, the independence of
both the executive and judicial branches, as well as the basic principles
underlying each.42 These interests are weighed on a case by case
basis. Obviously, this approach is more desirable than the wholesale
compromise of principles which would result from the recognition of
an absolute privilege on the one hand or the denial of a privilege as
a matter of law on the other.43 An additional strength of the Nixon
test is the presumption of validity afforded the President's assertion.
This presumption conforms the test to the separation of powers doctrine
by showing deference to the executive branch.
These strengths, however, may, in future applications, be out-
weighed by weaknesses in the test. The burden placed upon the party
seeking evidence is somewhat inequitable. It requires that party to
justify access to facts essential to his case, contrary to the accepted
methods of the Anglo-American legal system. 44 Furthermore, the
prestige of the parties involved and the questions pertaining to national
security that may arise in cases like Nixon may make it difficult for
lower federal and state court judges to render competent decisions.
Foremost among these weaknesses are problems in the mechanics
of the balancing test. Before a court is called upon to apply the Nixon
test, the party seeking production must comply with the pertinent
evidentiary requirements for obtaining a subpoena, such as showing
relevance and materiality. If the privilege is then asserted to prevent
disclosure, what further can be shown to overcome the President's pre-
sumption? Cases applying the standards of Rule 17(c),4" the rule
42. See text accompanying notes 12-15, 21-24 supra.
43. For the same reasons, a test similar to the one adopted in Nixon could be uti-
lized to evaluate "novel" privileges. For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), the Supreme Court seems to have applied a balancing test of sorts in weighing
the merits of the "journalist's privilege" to withhold the identity of his sources. In that
case, the Court held, again, that the demands of the criminal justice system compelled
disclosure. However, the first amendment guarantee of free press is also a fundamen-
tal right, and deserves, at least, the protection of a case by case weighing, if not a pre-
sumptive privilege in favor of the reporter, rather than a summary denial of judicial pro-
tection.
44. See cases cited note 31 supra.
45. The leading case interpreting these standards is Bowman Dairy Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951), which recognized that the subpoena duces tecum was not
intended to provide a method for discovery in criminal cases, but was merely a means
to expedite trials by establishing a time and place prior to trial for the inspection of
materials obtained through compliance with the standards of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Id. at 220. These standards were concisely stated by Judge Win-
field in United States v. lozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In order to pro-
cure pretrial production, the moving party must show that the documents are both evi-
426 [Vol. 53
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applicable in Nixon, indicate that this initial showing practically ex-
hausts the knowledge of the party seeking production. Indeed, not
much more than a general showing of relevance, admissibility and
specificity is possible in cases in which the documents sought are of a
secret nature.
One must assume, however, that something more is required to
rebut ,the presumption afforded the President than a reiteration of the
facts justifying the issuance of a subpoena. To conclude otherwise
would render the presumption meaningless-a mere form, serving no
purpose other than to frustrate the party seeking production and to pro-
long the court's inquiry. Apparently, the litigant must assert the basic
principles underlying his action itself as a part of this further showing.46
These rudimentary principles include, for example, any constitutional
rights of the litigants as well as any strong public policy reflected in
his suit. In addition, any facts that make the moving party's need criti-
cal to the maintenance of his action or that distinguish his case from
others of a similar nature should be asserted.47
In those cases in which -the underlying principles and special facts
presented are adjudged to rebut the presumption, something further
must be shown by the Executive to justify nondisclosure. Is the Pres-
ident now required to disclose the specific interests and conversations
that should be guarded?48  It may seem initially that disclosure of such
information to the courts would deprive the balancing test of its sub-
stance, since the same result could be reached through initial in camera
inspection without the delay occasioned by the Nixon -test. The process
dentiary and relevant, that they are not accessible by other means available to the party
seeking them, and that the materials are essential to the preparation of the case to be
presented. In addition, the application for the subpoena must be made in good faith
and not merely as a "fishing expedition."
46. In Nixon the principles underlying all criminal proceedings-the constitutional
rights of defendants to a fair trial and compulsory process, the need for efficiency and
justice in the system of criminal law, and the nation's committment to the rule of law-
when coupled with the special facts presented, note 47 infra, were adjudged to outweigh
the presumption. 94 S. Ct. 3106-08.
47. In Nixon these circumstances included the fact that the alleged injustices were
perpetrated in the offices of the White House. Moreover, the President had been de-
clared an unindicted co-conspirator by the grand jury investigating the Watergate scan-
dal. Brief for the Petitioner at 11-12.
48. This problem could also lead to litigation because the assertion of the general
privilege afforded in Nixon may constitute a waiver of other privileges recognized by
the courts, i.e. those resting on the need to protect military and diplomatic secrets. It
is suggested that this should be the case, since the assertion of the general privilege in
the face of such secrets would be little more than a frustration of the legal process and
a stalling tactic, if in fact privileges do exist for the specific purpose of protecting the
la~tional security.
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outlined in Nixon, however, affords the maximum protection for execu-
tive conversations by precluding disclosure, even to the courts, except
in those special cases in which the need for the documents outweighs
the presumption.
Furthermore, it has been argued that even in camera inspection
of the conversations would negate the beneficial results of the privi-
lege.49 There is, however, "no danger to the public interest in sub-
mit5.ng the question of privilege to -the decision of the courts. The
judges. . . are public officers whose responsibility under the Constitu-
tion is just as great as that of the heads of the executive departments."
0
When the presumption of judicial integrity is also considered, there is
sufficient protection afforded the executive in those comparatively few
cases in which the court is called upon to balance the important com-
peting interests presented.
Having reached the point in the test at which the needs of the
executive are to be weighed against the countervailing public and pri-
vate rights presented by the party seeking production, the court is faced
with a serious dilemma. Confronted with an array of conflicting princi-
ples and factual arguments, the courts will undoubtedly examine prior
cases to determine which faots have been crucial in decisions concern-
ing the exercise of executive privilege. These cases indicate that the
following facts carry considerable weight: whether the materials sought
are of primary importance to the case presented;5 the volume and
diversity of prior production by the party asserting the privilege;52 the
presence of available alternatives for obtaining the information
sought;53 allegations of governmental misconduct;54 and allegations of
49. The argument that the disclosure of executive deliberations to even one person
outside the executive branch would inhibit the flow of ideas necessary to effective deci-
sionmaking by instilling a fear of prosecution or public criticism in advisers has been
accepted by federal courts in previous cases. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See gen-
erally R. BERGER, supra note 2; F. RouRKE, supra note 2.
50. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U.S.
1 (1953). Judge Maris's views were adopted by the dissenters, Justices Black, Frank-
furter and Jackson, in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
51. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966),
af'd per curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
52. Id.
53. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B.
Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl
Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
54. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 1964); Bank
of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Rosee v. Board of Trade,
36 F.R.D. 684, 689 (N.D. Il1. 1965).
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perversion of government power.55 While such factors may be helpful
in reaching a decision, the court's ultimate determination can be made
only after considering -the case in the perspective of the political system
in which the judiciary functions.
The separation of powers doctrine, viewed in the realistic manner
presented in Nixon, must be the focal point of this consideration.56 In
weighing the public and private interests involved in such cases, it is
apparent that not all court-protected interests warrant an intrusion into
executive privacy. Of primary concern, however, is the judiciary's role
as a limiting factor in the tripartite system, as well as its dedication to
its function as a forum for the resolution of conflicts. The courts must,
therefore, conscientiously protect the mechanism for accomplishing
these purposes. Thus, those rights that are critical to this process
should outweigh the privilege in all cases except those presenting
countervailing interests most critical to the preservation of the govern-
mental system as a whole.
There is another important area which should be considered by
courts applying the Nixon test. The Supreme Court in Nixon assumed
that secrecy is both necessary and appropriate in the decisionmaking
process. 57  Secrecy is, however, by its very nature foreign -to and
potentially destructive of a democracy and its practical institutions. For
that reason, its use should be minimized, 'the indulgence in this practice
being permitted only in situations in which it is absolutely essential. A
consideration of this problem and an awareness of the trends toward
increasing use of secrecy and its validation by the Supreme Court
should be paramount in the deliberations of those applying the Nixon
test.
Nixon establishes an additional weapon in the executive arsenal
of secrecy. While the privilege recognized by the Court is not absolute,
it is one which places a substantial burden upon the party seeking evi-
dentiary materials in a criminal proceeding. Regardless of its availa-
55. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1960).
56. In contrast to the President's interpretation of the doctrine as a source of al-
most absolute independence among the branches, Chief Justice Burger viewed it as a lim-
iting factor. He stated that the "separate powers were not intended to operate with ab-
solute independence," but that each branch must depend upon the others for validation
and implementation of its actions. 94 S. Ct. at 3107. For example, the Congress relies
upon the Executive to carry out congressional declarations of war, a power expressly
delegated to the former. Likewise, the Executive relies upon funding from Congress for
the projects that the former deems important, and for confirmation of official appoint-
ments. The judiciary is instrumental in enforcing the acts of Congress and the decrees
of the Executive.
57. Id. at 3106.
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bility and validity in non-criminal proceedings or the extension of the
Court's reasoning into other areas of privilege, the implications of the
ruling are important when viewed in the context of the growth of execu-
tive power in the American system. In addition, serious weaknesses
in the Nixon test pose difficult problems for those who will apply it in
future cases. What is called for in response to the decision is extreme
presidential circumspection in asserting the privilege, as well as con-
tinued, responsible review by the courts. Hopefully, such judicious
exercise of power will prevent executive privacy from degenerating into
a convenient instrument for concealing from the public what it has a
right to know.
H. KING MCGLAUGHON, JR.
Constitutional Law-Lowering the Compelling State Interest
Hurdle
During the twelve years since its decision in Baker v. Carr,' the
Supreme Court has considered numerous challenges to state election
laws raised by potential voters and candidates. 2 In ruling upon these
challenges, the Court has developed an exacting standard to be applied
in determining whether a state's restrictions on the right to vote violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 Because
of the stringency of this standard, which requires a state to justify its
restrictions by showing their necessity to further a "compelling" state
interest,4 many state laws regulating voter qualifications and candidacy
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In this landmark, legislative apportionment case, the
Court extended equal protection to nonracial challenges of state election statutes. Note,
Oregon v. Mitchell and the Compelling State Interest Doctrine-The End of an Era?,
22 SYRwcusn L. Rav. 1123, 1125 (1971). In so extending the equal protection clause,
the Court "substantially modified the constitutional matrix in this area." 30 O-o ST.
L.J 202 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419
(1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
3. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), in which
the Court justified its imposition of this new test as follows: "This careful examination
is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our
representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may partici-
pate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy
of representative government." Id, at 626,
4. Id. at 627,
